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Abstract
The Minimalist Program introduced a new concept of language and added
new content to the innateness position concerning our linguistic capacity. It
also redeﬁned the metatheoretical role of the theory of acquisition within
generative grammar. This article explores at length all these issues and
o¤ers a critical survey of the disconcerting situation dominating today’s
relationship between syntacticians and acquisitionists.
1. Introduction
The emergence and the development of the Minimalist Program (MP)
provoked a change in how we judge the explanatory adequacy of the
principles attributed to the human faculty of language. We no longer con-
sider these principles good candidates for inclusion in the linguistic capac-
ity a child makes use of in constructing a grammar from an opaque and
fragmentary stimulation; rather we look at their adequacy as optimal
solutions for the needs imposed by the cognitive systems that language is
supposed to serve as a sort of bridge. Apparently, those who investigate
language acquisition have answered to this shift by ignoring or only su-
perﬁcially attending to the theoretical challenges introduced by the MP.
It is not the aim of this article to claim that this situation is to be
explained by the displacement of matters of acquisition to a secondary
position within generativism. We shall simply try to describe the state of
the art in the ﬁeld as well as to put forward some ideas on how to focus
the study of acquisition in accordance with the minimalist conception of
human language.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 attempts to clarify the
value of the classical ‘‘Poverty of Stimulus Argument’’ and to show that
its real argumentative power is in agreement with the position in which
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the MP places the questions related to the acquisition of language. This
very section examines the notion of ‘‘innateness’’ and explores a partial
redeﬁnition of it motivated by the main minimalist contentions about lan-
guage. Section 3 tries to show that recent research in the ﬁeld of language
acquisition seems in general (and in its essence) not to observe the crucial
theoretical challenges brought into linguistics by minimalism. In order to
reach this goal we have done a careful examination of the most relevant
articles on acquisition published during the years 2001 and 2002. Section
4 summarizes the main ideas of our article and comments on the current
divide between syntactic theory and acquisition theory, an undesirable
situation although utterly signiﬁcant, as it illustrates the confusion into
which the MP seems to have driven linguistic theorizing.
2. Innateness and Poverty of Stimulus in the Minimalist Program
The Poverty of Stimulus Argument (henceforth, PS argument), whose ul-
timate formulation is usually attributed to Chomsky (1980),1 is generally
accepted as the strongest foundation of the nativist position held by gen-
erative grammarians about human language.2 The truth is that the argu-
ment has been misinterpreted by many, especially by those who think that
proving its falsity is the most e¤ective way to discredit generativism. For
this reason, we will devote the following pages to clarifying the content of
the argument and its weight in support to the innateness thesis. We will
also dedicate some pages to rethinking and reformulating this thesis in
the light of the central contentions of the MP and of some recent debates
on the philosophy of biology.
2.1. Some thoughts on the argumentative power of the Poverty of
Stimulus Argument3
The PS argument tries to capture the contrast between, on the one hand,
the kind of data accessible to children in the process of acquiring their
mother tongue and, on the other, the grammatical competence they arrive
at as the result of that process. The basic tenet of the argument is that the
amplitude and rich articulation of the knowledge about language of any
normal child strongly contrasts with the scarcity and degeneracy of the
data she comes across. Actually, the deﬁciencies of the data are of di¤er-
ent kinds, which Thomas (2002) classiﬁes into three main groups, each of
them reﬂecting a di¤erent sense of the term ‘‘poverty’’ normally used in
this respect:4
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1. Degeneracy. Stimuli are poor because they contain defects such as
false starts, interrupted fragments, lapses, etc.
2. Finiteness. Stimuli are poor because they represent a very limited,
idiosyncratic, and accidental array of data from an inﬁnite set of
possibilities.
3. Partiality. Stimuli are poor because certain phenomena that the
child has no problems dealing with are completely absent from the
array of data at her disposal.
Thomas considers that the third aspect of the term has become its
central sense for most commentators of the PS argument, with the other
being progressively left in the background. This opinion seems to us es-
sentially correct, but it is important to note that the PS argument has
also to do with the absence or the scarcity of ‘‘negative evidence’’, i.e.,
marks on which the child could base the conclusion that certain utter-
ances are not acceptable in the adult grammar. This fact is of enormous
interest, because the child could never reach this kind of conclusion from
a ﬁnite and partial array of data (see Fodor and Crowther [2002], as well
as the extensive bibliography on the matter that they o¤er). The PS argu-
ment is also to be related with the fact that the rich and complex internal
articulation of any utterance is something an individual cannot be aware
of by simply observing its surface. Sentences do not mark their potential
structural ambiguity, the conjoint or disjoint reference of their compo-
nents and so on, and they only contain vague indications of the hierarchi-
cal structure hidden behind an otherwise lineal arrangement of items (see
Crain and Pietroski 2002). It is also important to notice that certain ele-
ments of the stimuli can be considered quantitatively poor in the sense of
not being persistent enough as to trigger the acquisition of the relevant
aspects of grammar (see Legate and Yang 2002).
The progressive identiﬁcation of ‘‘poverty’’ with ‘‘partiality’’, com-
mented on by Thomas, is, from our point of view, to be explained as an
e¤ect of the attention paid to this aspect of the PS argument by its critics
rather than as a real evolution in the contents of the argument itself, as it
can be observed in articles like Pullum and Scholz (2002) and Sampson
(2002). Pullum and Scholz denounce that not enough e¤ort has been de-
voted to recording grammatical phenomena that are indisputably absent
from the stimuli typically o¤ered to children: therefore, the PS argument,
in their opinion, is still waiting for conﬁrmation. Sampson defends (with
no special e¤ort of documentation) that any grammatical phenomenon
can be considered to be present in any representative sample of the lin-
guistic practices of a community: therefore, the PS argument is, Sampson
claims, false, as well as any theoretical consequence that one would wish
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to derive from it. However, as we have shown, the PS argument does not
reduce to this aspect, so questioning it is not enough to cast doubts on the
whole argument.
We will not go further into this debate. Our central aim in the remain-
der of this section will be to show that criticisms of the PS argument
intended to question the nativist position of generative grammar rely on
serious misunderstandings of the contents of the argument and of its
power in defense of that position. Let us start by examining a fallacy in
the argument put forward by Sampson (2002). He notices (correctly)
that the PS argument and the innateness hypothesis are related by logical
implication (PS! innateness), but he claims that the PS argument has
no empirical support. Sampson recognizes that the latter is not enough
to refute the innateness thesis, but in spite of this awareness, he concludes
that innateness is a ‘‘novel and surprising proposition’’, one that any rea-
sonable person should reject without the support of any well-established
fact (Sampson 2002: 97). Actually, what any reasonable person should
accept is that, even if stimuli were rich enough as to allow a data-driven
learning mechanism, such a fact would not decide by itself the question
about the procedure children really make use of when they learn to speak.
It happens that the implication PS! innateness has no real argumenta-
tive role in the reasoning presented by Sampson, whose real strategy (ob-
viously, a fallacy) relies on presenting innateness as extravagant.5
What critics of the PS argument seem not to understand is that if the
argument proved to be unsound, only the contention that stimuli are
poor should be rejected, with innateness remaining as legitimate a thesis
as before. The reason is that the PS argument (contrary to what is nor-
mally assumed) is not (or at least not directly) a ‘‘pro-innateness’’ argu-
ment, but an ‘‘anti-empiricism’’ one. The power of the argument relies
on the fact that any e¤ort to explain language acquisition as a process
guided from stimuli and the external circumstances of the child must be
abandoned if it proves to be correct. If, on the contrary, stimuli are
proved to be rich and capable of serving as the model from which to
derive any sort of grammatical rule or principle, then an empiricist inter-
pretation of language learning is in principle possible. However, even so,
this does not mean that this interpretation would be the only theoretical
alternative. One must never forget that a process guided by the internal
resources of the organism is possible irrespective of the richness or poor-
ness of stimuli.6
In other words, the PS argument is not a knife with two edges. It has
only one that threatens data-driven or empiricist theories of language ac-
quisition. It is certainly true, as pointed out by Pullum and Scholz, that
‘‘casting doubt on alleged PS argument cases [ . . . ] undercuts skepticism
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about data-driven learning’’ (Pullum and Scholz 2002: 46). That is all.
The fact that a theory can be considered possible to get around does not
imply that competing theories have lost their own legitimacy. Theories
are not required to monopolize in order to be worthy of credit.
2.2. The position of the PS argument within the Minimalist Program
The ideas of the previous subsection lead us to conclude that the PS argu-
ment has only an indirect or secondary role in the defense of innateness,
because its main argumentative value is to discredit empiricism. It is our
opinion that this conclusion is related to one of the contentions of the
MP, according to which the results of language acquisition theory are
also of a secondary interest in relation to the explanatory aims of linguis-
tic theory (see Chomsky 2000, 2001; see also below). This contention
seems rather surprising if one thinks of the central position of acquisition
matters within previous models of generative grammar, which acknowl-
edged explanatory adequacy to theories of grammar attending to their
credit as an hypothesis concerning the initial state of linguistic knowledge
children make use of when learning to speak. Let us remember Chom-
sky’s own words:
The problem of internal justiﬁcation — of explanatory adequacy — is essentially
the problem of constructing a theory of language acquisition, an account of the
speciﬁc innate abilities that make this achievement possible.7 (Chomsky 1965:
27)
The MP has shifted the criterion of explanatory adequacy, and theories
are now evaluated according to their capacity to account for the adjust-
ment of the Faculty of Language (henceforth, FL) to the cognitive mod-
ules that it is supposed to connect with: on the one hand, the systems of
thought by which we represent the external world or we ﬁgure out the
mental states of other people, and, on the other, the sensory-motor sys-
tems by which we exteriorize and internalize the signals containing our
and other people’s thoughts. Under the (not uncontroversial) claim that
the design of the FL aims to serve as an optimal channel, the MP con-
tends that the best version of it will be that which o¤ers the most immedi-
ate or direct connection between these two nonlinguistic modules, with a
minimum of (and, ideally, with no) speciﬁc grammatical machinery. At
the same time, the best theory of language will be the one capable of
modeling the FL according to the corresponding ideal: that is, attending
above all to the properties of the external systems and avoiding grammat-
ical notions and categories as much as possible. Chomsky declares that if
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theories conducted in this way happen to ﬁnd support from the results of
neurophysiology or language acquisition research, this will be good news,
but he also declares that these questions are ‘‘irrelevant in principle’’
(Chomsky 2000: 96). This means that they are not recognized as capable
of deciding among competing theories.8
Let us think again about the PS argument. It seems clear that its posi-
tion within the argumentative depot of the MP cannot be a central one.
That stimuli given to children are or are not poor is not directly related
with the main guidelines of the program, i.e., that language development
consists above all in the coupling of two cognitive systems of a very dif-
ferent nature. Within this framework, the ultimate goal of the theory
from the point of view of evolutionary psychology would be to discover
how those systems instruct the implementation of a linguistic system con-
necting them. If a solution to this question also happens to be a solution
to the problem of how children manage to undergo the process of acquir-
ing a language without the help of their environment, so much the better
for the theory. However, it is clear that the question about the richness or
the poverty of stimuli will be unessential to a theory aimed at solving the
problems of language development embracing the thesis of the MP.
2.3. On the grammatical speciﬁcity of the innate universal base
The MP also makes us question what kind of knowledge we can reason-
ably consider innate and even to rethink the very concept of innateness.
The broadly accepted contention of generativist grammarians up to the
nineties was that a well-deﬁned and richly structured set of speciﬁcally
grammatical knowledge was attributable to children prior to any linguis-
tic experience. However, the explanatory guidelines of the MP lead us to
reduce (and, ideally, to eliminate) the grammatical machinery used to de-
scribe the human faculty of language (see Lorenzo and Longa 2003: Sec-
tions 2 and 3). Under the assumptions made by the MP, the FL mainly
consists of ensembles of conceptual-intentional and sensory-motor units
provided by the external systems (lexical items), ready to be combined
by a computational procedure (syntax) whose functioning is governed by
principles of an enormous simplicity (binary merging, asymmetric projec-
tion, minimal movements or links, and so on), none of which should be
considered as extravagant grammatical criteria. What this actually means
is that the nature of the FL is not di¤erent from that of the external sys-
tems.9 It continues to be a universal and, conceivably, innate base, but
nevertheless not a speciﬁcally grammatical one. Given all these conclu-
sions, we become confronted with the following question: does it make
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any sense to continue talking about linguistic nativism? In our opinion,
we can answer this question a‰rmatively, providing that we partially re-
vise the idea of innateness.
The crisis and the reﬂection on the concept of innateness are actually
issues open to a very interesting debate among biologists and philoso-
phers of biology.10 We should not be surprised by the necessity to think
about its suitability in the ﬁeld of linguistics, where it has been used for
decades without so much reﬂection (see Cowie 1999). From our point of
view, linguistics should shift its ‘‘input-output model’’ of innateness and
embrace a ‘‘dispositional model’’, borrowing both categories from Stich
(1975).
The former model (input-output model ) strongly relies on the PS argu-
ment. It contains that the mismatch between, on the one hand, the scar-
city and the imperfection of the information around children (input) and,
on the other, the sophistication of the system of knowledge ﬁnally at-
tained (output), leads to conjecture their being in possession of an impor-
tant amount of information not derivable from experience and henceforth
innate. For instance, data is presented to children in a strictly linear or-
der, but they show early to be sensitive to a hierarchical organization
underlying it. The most reasonable conclusion seems to be that the gram-
matical principles of hierarchical organization are known by children
prior to any experience.
The second model (dispositional model ) is based on the idea that an
innate feature of a species is simply a property determined to appear at
certain point of the developmental process of any member of it. An im-
portant aspect of this idea is that it treats innate features as phenotypical:
what is innate, from this point of view, is the property and not the basis
of its development. This implies, for instance, that a certain property of
grammars can be considered innate in spite of not being the answer to a
speciﬁc grammatical instruction from an innate base. In the case of the
hierarchical mode of organization of linguistic utterances, the idea allows
for two kinds of explanation:
1. It is a feature inherited from the external systems. Along these
lines, Segal (1996), Cormack and Smith (2002) and Corballis
(2002) locate its foundations on the compositionality of thought
(even Fodor 1975: Ch. 3 can be so interpreted), while Calvin and
Bickerton (2000) relate it with the planiﬁcation and execution of
motor gestures.
2. It is a feature somehow unavoidable for any combinatorial system,
as held by Chomsky (1995a, 1995b), Berwick (1998) and Studdert-
Kennedy and Goldstein (2003).
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In any event, the model views such a property as innate attending to its
propensity to arise irrespective of the foundations of its development.11
It is easy to understand that there is no reason to abandon the thesis
of innateness with the MP framed within the dispositional model of
nativism. According to the MP, the ultimate foundations of the FL are
certainly not linguistic, the interaction of the external systems during de-
velopment being responsible for the emergence of a linguistic capacity
and with genes perhaps only in charge of the development of those non-
linguistic systems. The growing of the FL is thus to be considered a side
e¤ect of the development of the external systems, which establish the
conditions that, given a minimum amount of external stimuli, impel the
implementation of a linguistic capacity as an aspect of the cognitive
equipment of any individual. The FL is therefore an unavoidable result
of certain initial nonlinguistic conditions and not the ﬁnal outcome of an
initial state of linguistic knowledge.
Summing up, linguistic nativism does not compel us to postulate a rich
system of a priori linguistic knowledge somehow rooted in the genes. For
the idea of innateness to be acceptable, it is enough to sustain that the
genes establish certain phenotypical conditions from which the growing
of a linguistic capacity becomes inescapable.12 Such a conception of lin-
guistic nativism seems to us in complete agreement with the theoretical
basis of the MP.
3. The theory of language acquisition and the maximalist conception of
human language
Let us start by assuming the theoretically neutral idea that language con-
sists of a cognitive procedure for the exteriorization of our thoughts and
the internalization of other people’s thoughts (for the sake of simplicity,
we will use ‘‘exteriorization’’ as a term comprising both aspects of lan-
guage use). ‘‘Exteriorization’’ and ‘‘thought’’ can be seen as two indepen-
dent and autonomous activities, each one controlled from a speciﬁc cog-
nitive system: the system of thought and the sensory-motor system, also
known as the external systems when observed from the point of view of
language (see Section 2.2 above). The system of thought provides us
with the capacity of producing and maintaining intentional attitudes
about the world (including our and other people’s minds), while the
sensory-motor system controls the workings of our auditive, visual, oral
and gestural activities. From the point of view of the architecture of
mind, language (FL) can be thought of as a bridging faculty, in that
it provides the channel by which representations of the external systems
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become accessible to each other. Adopting this point of view, we can
question whether or not the FL is a faculty in the very sense that the ex-
ternal systems (whose speciﬁcity is left out of question by the MP) are. In
this respect, the linguist can endorse one of the following positions:
1. Maximalism. Language is a speciﬁc faculty of mind that imposes
its own representational format (grammar) on thoughts in order
to be translatable into psycho-motor instructions. According to
this position, our mind contains an independent grammatical de-
vice, very rich and highly speciﬁc in its internal articulation and
contents, which provides an interlingua between two systems other-
wise mutually unreadable.
2. Minimalism. Thought is directly externalizable and the mind does
not need to incorporate a speciﬁc grammatical system. This implies
that the primitives and mechanisms of the FL are for the most part
not di¤erent from the primitives and mechanisms of the external
systems. Such an alternative does not leave aside the possibility
that some unsystematic grammatical resources could be used in
order to increase the e‰ciency of the FL, insofar as they do not
constitute a representational vocabulary that forces an exhaustive
process of format conversion.13
It is safe to a‰rm that the Government and Binding Theory (GB) devel-
oped in the 1980s by generative grammarians exempliﬁes the clearest
manifestation of a maximalist conception of human language (see Chom-
sky 1981, 1986, 1988), while the MP represents the evolution of the gen-
erative enterprise toward a minimalist understanding of language (see
Chomsky 1995a, 1995b, 2000, 2001, 2002a, 2002b: Ch. 4, 2005). Notwith-
standing, it is important to note that even if the a‰liation to one or an-
other of those conceptions is something we can evaluate in absolute
terms, it is also true that we can measure the degree of maximalism or
minimalism of a particular approach to a given phenomenon. Let us ex-
plain this point. Suppose we adhere to the minimalist position: in this
case, our analysis of a particular linguistic fact could incorporate a cer-
tain amount of grammatical devices (i.e., elements uninterpretable by the
external systems) and its degree of minimalism could vary according to
the quantity of those devices. Anyway, our approach should qualify as
minimalist as long as it observes the thesis that languages are optimal
solutions to the legibility conditions imposed on them by the external
systems and that they incorporate a minimal amount of machinery not
readable by those systems (see Chomsky 2000: 96).
Something similar can be said about the maximalist conception of lan-
guage. We can characterize as such any approach that ascribes the same
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cognitive speciﬁcity to the FL as to the external systems. However, the
maximalism of a given study decreases if it imputes a certain prominence
to the external systems over the FL: for instance, if our approach con-
tends that the development of language is somehow instructed from the
external systems. Let us think on the idea developed by Pinker (1989), ac-
cording to which capturing phonological and semantic singularities could
be the key to ﬁxing the principles that constrain a given grammatical phe-
nomenon. We can interpret this by supposing that the steady state of
those principles is attained by resolving cues accessible by the external
systems. This idea can be further interpreted in two di¤erent ways: on
the one hand, those nongrammatical criteria could be understood as the
triggers of a pre-existent but incomplete grammatical structure; on the
other, the grammatical structure ﬁnally attained could be a not preﬁgured
result in any blueprint. It is important to understand that such a position
would not challenge either the innate character of the grammatical
competence (see Section 2.3 above) or the maximalist a‰liation of the
approach, in that it would respect the basic condition of attributing to
grammar a complete speciﬁcity from a cognitive point of view.
3.1. The concept of the FL in acquisition theory: a brief introduction to
the state of the art
A summary of the situation we will describe in the following pages could
read like this: while syntactic theory (henceforth, SynT) has directed its
e¤orts to explore and to justify the strongest versions of the minimalist
thesis from the beginnings of the nineties, acquisition theory (henceforth,
AcqT) is still dominated by extreme versions of the maximalist position.
Appearing as if a repellent force worked over both theoretical domains,
the fruitful feedback between their results for more than thirty years
seems to have been blown away with the arrival of the MP. Moreover,
the situation is especially odd if we attend to the facts that (i) practitioners
of each of these domains of inquiry seem not to be aware of it and that
(ii) they usually declare their conﬁdence in the existence of a community
of interests between the ﬁelds, the need to pay attention to each other,
and the acceptance of a sort of mutual control.
In order to present a preliminary view of the mismatch on the concep-
tion of the FL presumed by SynT and AcqT practitioners, we will start by
focusing our attention on Thornton and Wexler (1999) and Guasti (2002),
two works that can be considered to be illustrative of the state of the
art in AcqT. What follows is a brief account of ﬁve basic assumptions
normally taken for granted by acquisitionists, which actually open an
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insurmountable gap between their concept of the FL and that of syntacti-
cians. In the next subsection (see 3.2) we will review a comprehensive
sample of more speciﬁc articles corresponding to the period between 2001
and 2002 that basically conﬁrm the ﬁndings of this preliminary account.
3.1.1. Assumption 1: Universal Grammar (UG) as a richly articulated
S0. Thornton and Wexler (1999: 1) contend that ‘‘a basic tenet of this
theory [the theory of UG] is that much linguistic knowledge is part of
the child’s genetic makeup. This knowledge is encoded in the form of uni-
versal principles.’’ Guasti (2002: 1) expresses herself with very similar
words: ‘‘human beings are innately endowed with a system of richly struc-
tured linguistic knowledge.’’14
We have explained in a previous section that one of the ‘‘basic tenets’’
of the MP is that the idea of a rich, detailed and speciﬁc structure of ini-
tial linguistic knowledge must be replaced by a conception in which the
initial state must be (ideally) freed of any grammatical residue (see again
Lorenzo and Longa 2003: Section 3). According to this conception, FL
would be basically the result of the epigenetic processes triggered by the
contact between the performance systems it is designed to bridge. Accord-
ingly, FL would somehow lose its inherited character, but not (as previ-
ously explained) its congenital or innate nature.
3.1.2. Assumption 2: the principles of UG as domain speciﬁc. Both
Thornton and Wexler (1999) and Guasti (2002) assume that UG consists
of principles exclusively in charge of the well-formedness of linguistic ut-
terances. This means that they are only useful to a certain type of mental
computations: those which have to do with the production and interpre-
tation of sentences and other linguistic units. Guasti (2002: 8) points out,
for instance, that principles of UG ‘‘prohibit certain arrangements of
words, certain operations, and certain associations of sounds and mean-
ings’’ and that sentences must conform to its requirements ‘‘if they are to
be considered well formed or acceptable’’. Following the ideas put for-
ward by Chomsky (as in 1986: 4 or 1988: 47),15 it seems clear not only
that those tasks are completely entrusted in the principles of UG, but
also that they have no other cognitive role (see on this the comments of
Thornton and Wexler 1999: 1–2 and Guasti 2002: 404).16
The MP, on the contrary, tries to explain the principles that universally
constrain the form of languages and of its products either as reﬂexes of
the External Systems (interface conditions) or as bias towards the most
simple solutions in domains not regimented by speciﬁc rules (virtual
necessity conditions).17 FL thus looses the autonomy that it has within
maximalist models of language, in that most of its properties are those
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of other cognitive systems.18 Furthermore, it somehow becomes a ‘‘vir-
tual’’ component of mind, in the sense that an important part of its prin-
ciples does not need to be directly ‘‘printed’’ in the brain: it spontaneously
follows given no other criteria established to the same e¤ect.
3.1.3. Assumption 3: a syntactocentric conception of mind and gram-
mar. ‘‘The principles of binding are often called constraints because
they impose limits on the sentence forms and meanings that can be gener-
ated by the grammar. Constraints have assumed a central position in
theories, such as Chomsky’s theory of UG, that endow the child with in-
nate knowledge of syntactic properties’’ (Thornton and Wexler 1999: 6).
The content of this passage is directly applicable to any other domain of
grammar as conceived of by the GB model put forward by Chomsky
(1981) and subsequent works during the 1980s. The idea is basically that
of Assumption 2 above, but it also implies that the modules of mind di-
rectly connected with FL must ﬁt with the properties of grammar in order
to fulﬁll their role in tasks related with the production and interpretation
of utterances.
Things are considered to be the other way round by the MP: it is FL
which is supposed to adjust to the formal properties of the systems it
serves as a cognitive bridge. In other words, while according to the max-
imalist view it is the mind which must be adapted to its linguistic tool,
according to the minimalist position it is language which accommodates
and develops properties akin to those of other components of mind.
3.1.4. Assumption 4: a double hypothesis of modularity. The maximal-
ist model of grammar developed by GB theory characterizes human lan-
guage as ‘‘modular’’ in two di¤erent senses: on the one hand, FL is seen
as one of the components (or ‘‘modules’’) in which the mind is articu-
lated, each one being a specialized system from both an anatomical and
a functional point of view (external modularity); on the other hand, FL
itself is considered to be internally articulated in di¤erent subsystems
(or ‘‘submodules’’), each one devoted to a di¤erent aspect of the gramma-
ticality of an utterance (internal modularity). From the point of view of
external modularity, language is located at the same level of the analysis
of mind as other components such as vision, face recognition, motor con-
trol, and so on. From the point of view of internal modularity, language
is attributed a highly speciﬁc set of subsystems, such as phrase structure
theory, thematic theory, case theory, binding theory, control theory and
bounding theory. That this is the image of language assumed by Guasti
can be conﬁrmed by the following passage: ‘‘the comprehension of sen-
tences including nominal and pronominal expressions results from the
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interaction of various components or modules: the lexicon, a syntactic
binding component that prescribes the licit binding conﬁgurations, a se-
mantic component that interprets syntactic binding [ . . . ]’’ (Guasti 2002:
284).
Di¤erently, the MP relativizes, on the one hand, the condition of lan-
guage as a distinct module of mind (see Fox 2000: 67–74) and, on the
other, abandons the idea of its modular internal organization. Each of
these ideas follows almost directly from the assumptions enumerated
above, which imply a relaxation of the speciﬁcity of the FL, now seen as
highly sensitive and receptive to the functional requirements of the exter-
nal systems. As a consequence, the boundaries inter modules tend to dis-
appear and those residual aspects of FL which still can be thought of as
speciﬁc do not need to fall under particular components of grammar.19
3.1.5. Assumption 5: a representational and multistratal architecture.
The maximalist conception of the FL contends that the system in charge
of controlling the well-formedness of a linguistic utterance is organized as
a set of successive strata or levels of representation (D-Structure > S-
Structure > Phonological Form / Logical Form). An utterance is under-
stood as the result of a cyclic process of transformations and the levels are
the ‘‘loci’’ at which some of the subsystems of grammar verify that the
process is running according to the principles of UG.
The MP maintains, on the other hand, that the fulﬁllment of any con-
dition that a linguistic expression must obey can be procrastinated until
the point at which the ‘‘utterance-to-be’’ is submitted to the performance
systems. Consequently, the notion of ‘‘level of representation’’ has no mo-
tivation within the minimalist model of the FL and grammar becomes a
strictly derivational procedure (see on this Longa and Lorenzo 2001: Ch.
4). The architecture of the FL is basically reduced to a minimal distinc-
tion between a lexicon and a computational system. Expressions are legit-
imate as far as they are legible by the external systems and they are not
checked at any point of the derivational process. The steps of a derivation
are conducted by principles of extreme simplicity and no speciﬁc princi-
ples of grammar control their outcomes.20
The ﬁve assumptions enumerated up to this point are surely enough to
understand the magnitude of the theoretical gap remaining open between
the maximalist and the minimalist conceptions of the FL and, accord-
ingly, between AcqT and SynT, whose practitioners seem respectively in-
clined to the former and the latter image of human language, as we will
try to show in detail in the following subsections. But maybe Chomsky’s
own words introducing the MP are the most e¤ective means of expressing
such a breach:
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There is no Deep or Surface Structure, or other levels that have been proposed. It
holds that everything accounted for in these terms has been misdescribed and is
better understood in terms of legibility conditions at the interface: that includes
the Projection Principle, Binding Theory, Case Theory, the Chain Condition,
and so on. [ . . . ]. There should be no government, no stipulated properties of
chains, no binding relations internal to language, no interactions of other kinds
[ . . . ], no phrasal categories or bar levels, hence no X-bar theory or other theory
of phrase structure apart from bare phrase structure. (Chomsky 2000: 113)
Furthermore, he concludes that ‘‘a basic assumption of the work in the
Principles and Parameters framework [speciﬁcally, the GB model], with
its impressive achievements, is that everything just suggested is false: that
language is highly «imperfect» in these respects’’ (Chomsky 2000: 113).
But what happens to be false to Chomsky is, after all, that the FL is a
highly speciﬁc and autonomous component of mind, with a rich internal
articulation, whose contents have no justiﬁcation outside their grammati-
cal commitments.
The situation we are pointing at, and that we will try to illustrate at
large in the pages to follow, is that AcqT and SynT embrace images of
the FL not only conceptually in conﬂict but also mutually exclusive from
an empirical point of view. Contrary to certain statements, those images
do not simply respond to notational variants for the same phenomena (as
held by Rizzi 2000: 284, who says that bare phrase structure is but a
‘‘more rudimentary structural schemata’’ of X 0 Theory): actually, the
truth of one implies the falsity of the other. Nor are they di¤erent states
in a single line of conceptual evolution towards simplicity under other-
wise identical theoretical premises (as Friedemann and Rizzi 2000: 3 and
Valois 2000: 3 contend).21 The gap is a theoretically real and insurmount-
able one. In the present situation, thus, neither AcqT can be thought of as
an experimental ﬁeld for SynT nor SynT as a ‘‘think tank’’ for AcqT.
3.2. An analysis of the concept of FL in a selection of recent articles on
language acquisition
The previous section has o¤ered the background of the theoretical mis-
match between SynT and AcqT within the generative approach to human
language: while the former is devoted to hammering out the strongest
minimalist thesis from more than a decade, the latter still moves within
extreme versions of the maximalist conception of the FL. Such a break-
down of a formerly uniﬁed enterprise towards the explanation of the na-
ture of language is even more surprising if one notices the seeming lack of
awareness on both sides of the ﬁelds. In this subsection we will show the
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liveliness of the main maximalist assumptions about the FL in a represen-
tative sample of articles on acquisition published during the years 2001
and 2002 in the most diversiﬁed and prestigious journals on linguistic
theory and language acquisition.22 The review is organized as follows:
ﬁrstly, we will show the main theoretical lines shared by those articles
relative to the ﬁve assumptions established in the previous subsection
(Section 3.2.1); secondly, we will minutely examine a group of articles
that adheres to certain minimalist ideas while at the same time showing
a general maximalist view on language (Section 3.2.2); ﬁnally, we will
comment on the few articles that exhibit either a minimalist or, at least,
a weak maximalist view on the FL (Section 3.3.3).
3.2.1. Main theoretical trends
– Assumption 1: Universal Grammar (UG) as a richly articulated S0
The MP aims to eliminate any piece of grammatical machinery
(principles, conditions, rules, and so on) from UG, reinterpreting
the notion of S0 as a function of the development and contact of
the performance systems. Accordingly, the FL should be made of
primitives coming from those systems and should be ruled by crite-
ria also inherited from them or motivated by laws of necessity or
simplicity. In a way, the very notion of UG, understood as an in-
born structure of domain speciﬁc knowledge, loses almost all of its
original motivation within the minimalist framework. However,
most of the articles from our sample continue to rely upon a max-
imalist notion of UG,23 seen as the child’s innate knowledge of lan-
guage (Goodluck et al. 2001: 159, Babyonyshev et al. 2001: 1–2,
Thornton 2002: 258), as a domain speciﬁc array of grammatical
knowledge (Santelmann et al. 2002: 818, 838), or as the basic blue-
print of language (Hyams 2002: 229). Altogether, they leave us with
an image of UG as a rich structure of grammatical knowledge, i.e.,
unmotivated from the point of view of other cognitive domains, as
will be conﬁrmed in the following point.
– Assumption 2: the principles of UG as domain speciﬁc
Matsuo and Du‰eld (2001: 306) base their analysis of gapping con-
structions in English on very ‘‘speciﬁc syntactic constraints’’,24
while Santelmann et al. (2002: 838) speak of ‘‘fundamental syntac-
tic principles’’. McKee and McDaniel (2001: 114, 115, 118) articu-
late their analysis of extraction of resumptive pronouns according
to highly speciﬁc grammatical principles and Drozd (2001: 97) ana-
lyzes the behavior of negative DPs in a very similar vein. Goodluck
et al. (2001: 169) point out the possibility of certain aspects of early
A minimalist theory of language acquisition? 555
Brought to you by | Universidad de Oviedo
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/10/15 11:48 AM
grammars being controlled by semantic (i.e., intentional and con-
ceptual) criteria, but conclude that in the steady state ﬁnally at-
tained those very aspects become controlled by speciﬁcally gram-
matical principles. Babyonyshev et al. (2001) work with the idea of
a pre-existent set of grammatical principles open to a maturation
process and, not surprisingly, they follow Chomsky (1981)’s analy-
sis of passive constructions.25 Hyams (2002) and Petinou and Terzi
(2002) assume a full-ﬂedged functional structure with uninterpret-
able heads, and the latter also assume the X 0 vocabulary, a typical
illustration of a violation of Chomsky’s (1995b) Principle of Inclu-
siveness.26 Tracy (2002: 656) observes that many crucial notions of
her analysis (such as ‘‘head’’, ‘‘agreement’’, ‘‘scope’’ or ‘‘binding’’)
‘‘do not arise in other cognitive domains’’. The situation so far de-
scribed contrasts heavily with the minimalist ideas in favor of the
functional indeﬁnition (or generality) and the functional subordina-
tion (to the performance systems) of the vocabulary and principles
of the FL.
– Assumption 3: a syntactocentric conception of mind and grammar
Most of the articles under scrutiny embrace without criticism a self-
contained and autonomous concept of grammar. Crago and Allen
(2001) employ a theory based on the [einterpretable] character of
the [D] feature, but with no comment at all about the systems of
thought which are supposed to be the foundations of such a distinc-
tion. Santelmann et al. (2002: 815) recognize that semantic and
pragmatic factors are certainly relevant in the acquisition of ques-
tion formation, but they focus on the problems raised by inversion
in child grammar without dealing with those factors. McKee and
McDaniel (2001: 115) analyze the extraction of resumptive pro-
nouns in child grammar by means of principles that make no
reference to the exigencies of the interfaces. Goodluck (2001) ap-
proaches the analysis of adjunct PRO clauses under the assumption
that the child operates with them without the help of her knowledge
of the lexicon of the language.27 Hyams (2002) also dissociates
grammatical and lexical knowledge when explaining the projection
of functional categories. Borer and Rohrbacher (2002: 132–133)
adopt a ‘‘top down’’ model in which syntax ‘‘determines the choice
of words’’. It is very clear in all these articles that syntax is at the
core of all the workings of language and, crucially, of the process
of language acquisition.
– Assumption 4: a double hypothesis of modularity
Babyonyshev et al. (2001) adopt Chomsky’s (1981) analysis of pas-
sive constructions and Goodluck (2001) bases her analysis of PRO
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and nominal constructions on Jaeggli (1986). Both Chomsky (1981)
and Jaeggli (1986) work with principles coming from di¤erent mod-
ules of grammar (theta theory, case theory, and so on). McKee and
McDaniel (2002: 149) contend that the acknowledgment of the con-
tributions of the performance systems in the developmental pro-
cesses does not imply ‘‘sacriﬁcing modularity (in the architecture of
language and cognition and in the di¤erent linguistic systems)’’.
Santelmann et al. (2002) dissociate the analysis of inversion from
the analysis of any other concurrent factor (type of verb, modality,
and so on) of a question. In all the cases, the result is a strongly
compartmentalized and very sophisticated image of grammar.
– Assumption 5: a representational and multistratal architecture
Contrary to the previous assumptions, this one is almost absent
from the articles of our sample. Most of the articles adopt the idea
of a ‘‘spell-out’’ point at which the derivation divides into two par-
allel processes (PF and LF), with conditions applying at the inter-
faces of those parallel derivations with the performance systems.
Only Babyonyshev et al. (2001), Goodluck (2001) and Matsuo and
Du‰eld (2001) continue to apply ﬁlters of grammar at certain spe-
ciﬁc points of the derivation.
3.2.2. Mixtures of maximalist and minimalist contentions: a brief analy-
sis. Some of the articles under scrutiny, while adopting a clearly maxim-
alist conception of language, incorporate certain theoretical elements of
the MP within their analytical depot. In this respect, it is important to
note two di¤erent things:
1. that the image of FL that serves as the theoretical background for
these articles is not a very congruous one; and
2. that in most cases those minimalist notions are not the ones that
the articles are trying to test from the point of view of language
acquisition.
Let us start by commenting on Wexler (1999), a very illustrative piece of
work in this sense (in spite of being outside of our chronological scope).
Wexler (1999: 78–79) suggests that certain aspects of linguistic matura-
tion are a function of prior maturation and coordination of the interface
levels. This clearly sounds like a minimalist assumption: some elements of
the computational system of grammar are settled from the performance
systems (system of thought and sensory-motor system). Wexler devotes
himself to the analysis of certain phenomena concerning relationships be-
tween the computational system and the system of thought; we will con-
centrate ourselves on his analysis on the acquisition of ﬁniteness.
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Wexler starts by observing that during the ‘‘optional inﬁnitive stage’’,
Tense is optional in the grammar of children acquiring a ‘‘non-pro-
drop’’ language. His explanation to this fact is that the child does not
know whether the D feature is or is not an interpretable one (in adult
grammar this feature is always [þinterpretable]). When the child takes D
as an interpretable feature, she produces sentences resembling those of
adults; when the child takes the feature as an uninterpretable one, she
omits Tense, thus preventing D from being checked twice (against Tense
and against AgrS). Wexler (1999: 100) contends that if the hypothesis
proves to be true, then it is possible to assert that children have a com-
plete knowledge of the functioning of the Computational System and
that they only need to ﬁx their knowledge concerning the interpretative
status of features, obviously dependant on their role in performance.
Wexler’s article thus concedes a central role to the external systems in
the development of FL, very much in the spirit of minimalism. However,
his general framework is far from being a really minimalist one: he con-
tends that the Computational System is an autonomous module of mind,
its functioning being governed by very speciﬁc principles and its develop-
ment consisting in the growing of a scheme which is unmotivated from
the point of view of the external systems. On his view, the development
of language is to be related with an explicit genetic program (see Wexler
1999: 56–58, 69, 74, and 77) more than with the development of the ex-
ternal systems.
Borer and Rohrbacher’s (2002) article includes many minimalist ideas,
such as the centrality of checking theory. However, they contend that
syntax is in charge of the selection of words, thus embracing a syntac-
tocentric model of the FL unfamiliar to the main trends of the MP.
Crago and Allen (2001) focus their attention on the optional inﬁnitive
stage in the development of Inuktitut grammar, adopting Wexler’s
(1998) key ideas and his (1999) analysis. In spite of the central role of
the [einterpretable] status of features within this framework, the fact
that nothing is said about the foundations of such a distinction is very
revealing.
Hyams (2002) defends a strong continuity between the child grammar
and the adult grammar of Greek speakers. She assumes many elements of
the MP in her analysis, such as checking theory, a phrase structure com-
ponent based on the operation Merge, and so on. She even claims that
her article gives additional support to Chomsky’s idea concerning the pri-
macy of Merge over Move/Attract (Chomsky 2000; see Hyams 2002:
258). However, the main ideas that the article is devoted to testing are
not of a minimalist a‰liation: i.e., that the functional structure of sen-
tences is part of the basic blueprint of language (Hyams 2002: 229), and
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that UG consists of a set of universal grammatical principles (p. 263).
Furthermore, the article dissociates lexical and grammatical knowledge
very strongly and it holds that the child has a very complete syntactic
competence even prior to being capable of putting it to use by the inser-
tion of complete paradigms (p. 231). It is also clear that Hyams under-
stands that syntax is the way for children to discover the interpretative
subtleties of adult grammar (p. 234), and not the other way round.
McKee and McDaniel (2001) also adhere to many ideas of the MP.
For instance, they take resumptive pronouns to be the spell-out of traces,
pronounced when the traces themselves are not legitimate given certain
economy-based constraints governing derivations (p. 113). Nevertheless,
they insist on the speciﬁcally syntactic nature of the principles constrain-
ing extraction operations (p. 114–115) and they make no reference at all
to the interfaces and their constraining role upon syntax.28 Petinou and
Terzi’s (2002) analysis of clitic misplacement in a variant of Greek fol-
lows certain minimalist ideas, such as checking theory, while retaining
many elements of the maximalist approach, such as the X 0 theory in the
analysis of phrase structure.29 In a similar vein, Santelmann et al. (2002)
ground their analysis of inversion on Chomsky (1995b), but they adopt a
strong domain-speciﬁc and syntactocentric conception of FL. Moreover,
they do not explore the role of the external systems in the development of
inversion, despite the signiﬁcance of the interpretable feature [Wh] in their
analysis.30
As a last illustration, Tracy (2002) defends the idea that children make
use of three di¤erent resources when discovering the abstract properties of
grammars: (i) a six domain-speciﬁc principled UG; (ii) certain general
cognitive strategies; and (iii) a mechanism in charge of inferring the exis-
tence and the position of heads and thus establishing the linking between
UG and the input (HEad DeteCTOR or Hector). Components (i) and (ii)
represent an evident interplay of maximalist and minimalist means in or-
der to reach the goal of acquiring the grammar of a given language. But
perhaps more curious than this is Tracy’s contention that by applying the
Hector children somehow can be said to be holding the presumption of a
perfect design underlying the input, in the spirit of Chomsky (2001). The
idea sounds rather weird if one notices that the Hector is ancillary to the
X 0 scheme (an imperfect device, in Chomsky’s view) and that UG (in
Tracy’s framework) contains six domain-speciﬁc (and hence imperfect)
principles. We should once more remember that the minimalist notion of
‘‘perfection’’ has nothing to do with the matching of certain a priori
grammatical knowledge with the input, but rather with the possibility of
deriving any piece of our knowledge about language either from the ex-
ternal systems or from principles of a very general and unspeciﬁc nature.
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3.2.3. Non-strongly maximalist articles: a brief analysis. Only two of
the articles so far considered can be labeled as non-strongly maximalist:
Jordens (2002), which embraces a weak version of maximalism, and Gav-
ruseva and Thornton (2001), a piece of work which can be classiﬁed as
strongly minimalist.
Jordens (2002), a study on the acquisition of ﬁniteness in Dutch, de-
fends the idea that this grammatical feature does not exist in the earliest
states of grammar, which means that it has to be acquired by children.
The author proposes a developmental process crossing three stages, each
one with an increasing degree of grammatical specialization. Namely, in
stage one (or holistic stage) ﬁniteness is expressed by means of holistic
modal operators, while in stage two (or conceptual-ordering stage) a series
of proto-functional items are acquired in order to express illocutionary
force. In this second stage, utterances consist of three structural positions,
each one showing a certain discursive specialization: topic (ﬁrst position),
illocutionary force (second position) and information concerning the top-
ic (third position). These positions are syntactically related by adjunction,
with a lineal ordering based on information processing criteria. In stage
three (or ‘‘ﬁnite-linking’’ stage), the proto-functional category in charge
of the expression of illocutionary force gets reinterpreted by means of
the functional category AUX as a side e¤ect of the acquisition of auxil-
iary verbs. Moreover, the simultaneous emergence of auxiliaries and pro-
nouns related with the external argument triggers the agreement relation
between AUX and the argument. In this stage adjunction is also replaced
by a properly hierarchical structure, with AUX adopting the role of head.
To sum up, Jordens contends that acquiring ﬁniteness implies a develop-
mental process crossing a pragmatic stage, a lexical stage, and a properly
grammatical stage, each one representing the adoption of an increasing
degree of grammatical machinery.
We judge Jordens’ article as weakly maximalist attending to the role at-
tributed to the performance systems (namely, the system of thought) in
the developmental process leading to the acquisition of a certain aspect
of grammar. However, we are refrained from designating it as minimal-
ist (even weakly minimalist) by the fact that the process leads to a self-
contained and highly speciﬁc grammatical system.
Gavruseva and Thornton (2001) study the acquisition of whose-
questions in order to elucidate whether the child ‘‘knows’’ that the whole
whose-phrase undergoes obligatory pied-piping. They focus their atten-
tion on children that produce segmented whose-questions, i.e., with
(sub)extraction of the wh-possessor (such as ‘‘who do you think’s ﬂower
fell o¤?’’). They contend that such segmented questions are not due to
the deﬁcient setting of a parameter, but to the application of a natural
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economy principle that delays the application of the PF ﬁlter that requires
the pied-piping of certain entire phrases. The authors work with natural
economy or virtual necessity conditions inspired by Chomsky (1995a,
1995b) and they claim that such conditions govern both the language ac-
quisition device and the computational system, competing with other con-
ditions projected from the performance systems. The resulting picture is
therefore very much on the spirit of the MP.
4. Concluding remarks
It is our opinion that this article illustrates at large the current divorce be-
tween SynT and AcqT within the generative framework. On the one
hand, SynT has withdrawn acquisition matters from the criteria govern-
ing the explanatory adequacy of theoretical proposals; AcqT, on the
other hand, seems to accept neither the redeﬁnition of innateness nor the
concept of the FL provided by SynT. It is clear that AcqT has stopped
being applied to validating the results of SynT, but it is also clear that ac-
quisitionists do not seem to understand (or at least not explicitly) that the
results of their own research programs are somehow questioning some of
the speculations held by minimalist syntacticians. The situation is even
more confusing given the fact that many acquisitionists declare them-
selves followers of the MP, usually against the premises and conclusions
of their own work.31 We cannot predict the future developments of the
situation, but we would like to conclude our article by proposing two
points of clariﬁcation that the ﬁeld urgently needs:
1. The development of a really minimalist research program in lan-
guage acquisition would be very important. The results of such a
program would be of enormous interest. Moreover, even if the
MP does not acknowledge the metatheoretical role that generative
grammar used to assign to AcqT, it is however out of question that
acquisition continue to be an experimental ﬁeld of primary interest
for theoretical linguistics of any orientation.
From our point of view, in order to make the MP its own frame-
work, AcqT should urgently take into account capacities that are
not linguistic by nature (or not speciﬁcally linguistic), either related
to the conceptualization of the environment or to the performance
of motor plans, in order to verify the possibility that there AcqT
will ﬁnd the key to explaining the main design features of grammar
and its development in the child’s mind (unspeciﬁcity of the
computational procedures, tendency towards the simplest or most
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economic procedures, etc.). Another recommendation that any
theory based on minimalist premises should urgently accept is to
avoid any kind of grammatical imperfections (uninterpretable cate-
gories, elements introduced during the computation and levels of
representation that are unconnected to the external systems), at least
as the starting hypothesis about the initial state of the FL. A mini-
malist theory on acquisition should be ultimately based on the
strongest approximation possible to the ‘‘bare conditions’’ imposed
by the external systems as optimal descriptions (even though
‘‘amendable’’) that might be attributed to the S0 of FL, thus satisfy-
ing Chomsky’s assumptions concerning a true ‘‘principled’’ expla-
nation of the properties of language: ‘‘We can regard an explanation
of properties of language as principled insofar as it can be reduced
to properties of the interface systems and general considerations
of computational e‰ciency and the like’’ (Chomsky 2005: 10).
2. Work on language acquisition with a nonminimalist alignment
should make explicit its maximalist premises and present itself as
critical and capable of questioning the contentions of the MP.
Some comments about this point are in order. One of the reviewers
of this article has pointed out to us that ‘‘Chomsky [ . . . ] did not
create [the MP] to account for how children acquire language’’,
which, in his opinion, frees those who study acquisition from the
need to adopt the theoretical principles of this frame (‘‘I do not
see why generative acquisitionists should use machinery developed
in the MP’’). We acknowledge that his ﬁrst assertion is absolutely
correct, but we think that the conclusion that the reviewer reaches
from that assertion is much more doubtful.
As far as the ﬁrst point of the question is concerned, we indeed
sustain that in the MP framework the acquisition of the native lan-
guage stops granting explanatory criteria to the theory of gram-
mar, which is now assumed by the ‘‘strongest minimalist thesis’’,
according to which a theory of grammar is the more explanatorily
adequate the more it assumes an adjustment between the function-
ing of the external systems and that of grammar itself (see, how-
ever, Eguren and Ferna´ndez Lagunilla [2004: 216], who expose a
point of view that is contrary to ours). But this does not mean
that acquisition has lost any interest to the theory of grammar: the
fact that Chomsky declares it to be ‘‘irrelevant in principle’’ implies
only that the learning perspective must not condition the departure
point of the theoretical formulations, but does not imply that it
cannot be conceded ‘‘relevance a posteriori ’’ as an additional ele-
ment of corroboration.
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As regards the second point, it is unquestionable that any type of
experimental research must take as a point of departure a certain
theoretical model about the object that will be studied, and the re-
search of language acquisition cannot be an exception. The FL
model suggested by the MP is, in principle, as good as any other
to face this kind of research, regardless of the degree of attention
that acquisitionists may receive to the results of their work. There
is nothing that prevents acquisitionists from adopting the model of
grammar suggested by the MP as appropriate to account for the
way children acquire language and also from aspiring to their ex-
perimental conclusions being acknowledged as a further factor of
correction or even of disapproval of such a model. Besides, there
is obviously nothing that prevents acquisitionists from adopting a
maximalist model of grammar as well. Nevertheless, if that should
be so, they must assume that they work against the mainstream of
basic research and that, at most, their conclusions should be better
presented as corrections rather than as validations of the most re-
cent developments of the generative framework.
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1. See Thomas (2002) for an historical approach. We disagree with this author in that
Chomsky (1959) seems to us to point to the argument much more than she is inclined
to accept.
2. A signiﬁcant reference in this context is Hoekstra and Kooij (1988: 45). They claim
that the postulation of linguistic universals is only a derivative aim of the theory in
that it must be subordinated to the main goal of explaining the uniformity of language
acquisition in spite of a ‘‘varied, degenerate, random and nonstructured experience’’.
This is also a recurrent theme in Lightfoot’s works. See Lightfoot (1999) and Anderson
and Lightfoot (2002).
A minimalist theory of language acquisition? 563
Brought to you by | Universidad de Oviedo
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/10/15 11:48 AM
This should not be interpreted to mean that other arguments concerning the charac-
terization of language as an innate faculty (like those having to do with uniformitarian-
ism, heritability of language impairments, etc.) are not relevant within the context of an
‘‘in depth’’ reconsideration of the thesis. However, we will focus here on the PS argu-
ment, taking into account (1) that it is the argument most closely related to learnability
matters and (2) that in Section 3 we shall comment only on articles on ﬁrst language
acquisition and not on language universals or language impairments.
3. This section was written after the publication of the monographic issue of The Linguis-
tic Review (2002) 19 (1–2) on the Poverty of Stimulus Argument. We will focus our
discussion on the ideas expressed in this issue, sometimes ignoring previous debates on
the matter.
4. Hornstein and Lightfoot (1981: 9–10) had already suggested that the deﬁciencies attrib-
uted to linguistic stimuli are of three kinds, namely those summarized by Thomas.
5. To present innateness as a ‘‘novel and surprising proposition’’ is only possible if one
forgets (or simply ignores) the historical philosophical (Plato, Descartes or Leibniz),
psychological (Huarte de San Juan) and even linguistic (von Humboldt) antecedents
of the idea.
6. In close relation with this, Fodor and Crowther (2002: 115, [our emphasis]) point out
that ‘‘children may be exposed to a linguistic construction shortly before ﬁrst uttering it
even if exposure to it is not necessary for knowing it and using it correctly’’.
7. A more recent but identical claim can be found, for instance, in Crain (1991: 597):
‘‘a fundamental goal of linguistic theory is to explain how natural languages are
acquired’’.
8. In Chomsky’s (2000: 96) own words: ‘‘Suppose that FL satisfying legibility conditions
in an optimal way satisﬁes all other empirical conditions too: acquisition, processing,
neurology, language change, and so on. Then the language organ is a perfect solution
to minimal design speciﬁcations. [ . . . ] The Minimalist Program explores the possibility
that language approaches ‘‘good design’’ in this sense. The strongest minimalist thesis
would be this: ‘‘Language is an optimal solution to legibility conditions’’. Insofar as
the thesis is true, information about other matters (sound-meaning connections,
neurophysiology, etc.) [also acquisition; see above] may be helpful in practice — even
indispensable — for discovering the nature of FL and its states. But it is irrelevant in
principle’’.
9. Perhaps with a residual and nonstructured amount of grammatical or noninterpretable
features (case, agreement, etc.). See Chomsky (2000: Section 3.5).
10. See the monographic issue of The Monist on the ‘‘Philosophy of Biology’’, which con-
tains two very important articles on innateness: Gri‰ths (2002) and Maclaurin (2002).
11. Along these lines, Maclaurin (2002: 126) claims that ‘‘all I require for the existence
of an innate trait is that there exist within the population some mechanism or process
that maintains the developmental resources which very reliably produce the trait in
question’’. The idea does not prejudge anything about the speciﬁc mechanism of devel-
opment, in that ‘‘it must accept traits that are built into populations by a variety of
di¤erent mechanisms and it must accept traits that are built into populations by a vari-
ety of ways’’ (Maclaurin 2002: 109).
12. Thus in agreement with the concept of epigenesis as deﬁned by Futuyma (1998: 651):
‘‘the processes that intervene during the development of an organism (its ontogeny) be-
tween primary gene action and the phenotypic traits’’. See Lorenzo and Longa (2003:
652–653) on the application of the idea to the goals of the MP.
13. It is interesting to note that Newmeyer (1998: 27–32) considers ‘‘systematicity’’ as
the key feature of an autonomous and speciﬁc grammatical component of mind. It
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is this feature, in our opinion, that is most left aside by a minimalist conception of
language.
14. See, along the same lines, Anderson and Lightfoot (2002), Crain and Pietroski (2001),
Crain and Lillo-Martin (1999), Friedemann and Rizzi (2000), Lust (1999), Valois
(2000) and Wexler (1999), among many others.
15. Chomsky asserts there that FL has ‘‘speciﬁc structure and properties’’ (1986: 4) and
that it incorporates ‘‘quite speciﬁc principles’’ (1988: 47).
16. In Crain and Wexler’s (1999: 388) words: ‘‘language apparatus [ . . . ] operates
according to principles that are speciﬁc to it and not shared by other cognitive
systems’’.
17. See Lorenzo (2001: Ch. 4).
18. As Chomsky (2005: 9) puts it, ‘‘we need no longer assume that the means of gener-
ating structured expressions are highly articulated and speciﬁc to language. We can
seriously entertain the possibility that they might be reducible to language-independent
principles’’.
19. According to the maximalist conception, the faculty of language is a highly speciﬁc sys-
tem of knowledge; according to the minimalist conception, it is more like an ‘‘inter-
modular’’ transfer system. Using Samuels’ (2000) terminology, the transition from the
former conception to the latter is essentially a transition from a ‘‘Chomskyan module’’
(Grammar, in the GB style) to a ‘‘Darwinian module’’ (the Faculty of Language ‘‘in
the narrow sense’’ — FLN — of Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch 2002).
20. The elimination of any level of representation (such as S-Structure) or of any represen-
tational vocabulary (such as c-command) can be seen as an aspect of the ‘‘strongest
minimalist thesis’’ under the assumption that derivations and derivational vocabulary
(such as Merge) are still needed. Brody (2002) contends that the opposite can also be
defended and he argues in favor of a radical representationalist approach to syntax
(see Brody 1995 and further works). The idea is, however, infrequent within generative
theorizing, as Brody himself recognizes (see Brody 2002: 19). We therefore choose to
ignore it in this article.
21. The following passage from Thornton and Wexler (1999: 4–5) could serve to illustrate
this attitude: ‘‘The technical implementation of the binding theory has changed as the
theory of generative grammar has evolved, and it is still in ﬂux as the Minimalist Pro-
gram is being developed (Chomsky 1995) [ . . . ]. The exact implementation of the prin-
ciples is not crucial to us, however. What is crucial is that the binding theory, however
formulated, is part of the language apparatus and, presumably, part of children’s in-
nate knowledge’’.
22. The criterion at work for our search and further analysis was to select generative
articles dealing with the acquisition of syntactic (and/or syntactic-semantic) aspects
in normal (nonimpaired) children. According to such criteria, we have selected the fol-
lowing 16 articles: Babyonyshev, Ganger, Pesetsky, andWexler (2001), Borer and Rohr-
bacher (2002), Crago and Allen (2001), Drozd (2002), Gavruseva and Thornton (2001),
Goodluck (2001), Goodluck, Terzi, and Chocano Dı´az (2001), Hyams (2001), Jordens
(2002), Matsuo and Du‰eld (2001), McKee and McDaniel (2001), Petinou and Terzi
(2002), Santelmann, Berk, Austin, Somashekar, and Lust (2002), Snyder, Senghas,
and Inman (2001), Thornton (2002) and Tracy (2002). They come from the following
journals: Canadian Journal of Linguistics, Journal of Child Language, Journal of Lin-
guistics, Language, Language Acquisition, Lingua, Linguistic Inquiry, Linguistics, Lin-
guistics and Philosophy, Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, The Linguistic
Review, and Theoretical Linguistics. It should be noted, though, that the situation
remains unchanged as regards papers presented at conferences. For instance, the
A minimalist theory of language acquisition? 565
Brought to you by | Universidad de Oviedo
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/10/15 11:48 AM
Proceedings of the 26th (November 2001) and 27th (November 2002) Boston Univer-
sity Conference on Language Development (see respectively Skarabela, Fish, and Do
2002; Beachley, Brown and Conlin 2003) contain more than 30 articles that meet our
requirement. However, only 3 of them adopt (fully or partially) a framework based on
minimalist assumptions.
23. Actually, all of them, with the exception of Jordens (2002) and Gavruseva and Thorn-
ton (2001).
24. For a minimalist approach of ellipsis and related phenomena (antecedent contained de-
letion, verb phrase ellipsis, pseudogapping,), see Lasnik (1999a: Ch. 3, 5, 7).
25. Consequently, their analysis of A-chains fully assumes a GB framework. See Lasnik
(1999b) and specially Bobaljik (2002) for a minimalist approach to such chains.
26. On this issue, see Chomsky (1995a) and Collins (2002). An anonymous Linguistics re-
viewer correctly observes that some research of unequivocal minimalist a‰liation con-
tinues to use the X 0 scheme as the model of phrase structure and he points out Lasnik
(1999c) as a standard example. In fact, it is a relevant case and worth commenting on,
since in his article he adds the use of uninterpretable functional categories (AgrS,
AgrO, against the Principle of Full Interpretation) to the inclusion of objects that are
due to the X 0 scheme (against the Principle of Inclusiveness). And, even if the use of X 0
metalanguage in an article as the one we are commenting on may be considered uncon-
troversial, since it is used only as a convenient notational system, the point concerns
the projection of the aforementioned functional categories and the crucial role they
play in the analysis. Does this mean that the work done by Lasnik should better be
classiﬁed as ‘‘nonminimalist’’? Certainly not. We must not forget that minimalist
theory takes principles as ‘‘inclusiviness’’ or ‘‘full interpretation’’ as points of departure
and introduces ‘‘corrections’’ (for example, levels of projection or uninterpretable cate-
gories; that is to say, ‘‘imperfections’’) Only by doing so we can reduce the data to a
better explanation. We can, therefore, see Lasnik’s heads and uninterpretable projec-
tions as ‘‘partial corrections’’ of the initial assumptions of the research program, which
he, apart from that, accepts. However, those aspects that we have discussed above
in the acquisition literature are prone to a considerably di¤erent analysis, because in
such cases the ‘‘imperfections’’ do not result from the demands required by the expla-
nation, but are part of the initial assumptions. In that way, the motivation of the au-
thors is evidently ‘‘nonminimalist’’.
27. O’Neill (1997), Cormack and Smith (2002) and Hornstein (2001: Ch. 2) deserve careful
consideration regarding their minimalist treatment of PRO phenomena.
28. See Boeckx (2003) and McCloskey (2002) for a minimalist approach to resumptive pro-
nouns and related phenomena.
29. See Boskovic (2001) and Panagiotidis (2002) as examples of studies approaching clitics
from a minimalist perspective.
30. See Chomsky (1995b: 289¤.) and Bailyn (2004).
31. Even though in our article we have observed a tendency toward superﬁcial invocation
of assumptions and notions of the MP, which is not followed up by an e¤ort truly in-
tended to validate them, we should also recognize that this does not always happen.
Jordens (2002), to which one of the reviewers calls our attention, is perhaps the most
outstanding example. Jordens’ research has an obvious generativist orientation, even
though showing a certain onset neutrality regarding the ‘‘minimalist/maximalist de-
bate’’, because the use of notions such as functional category, adjunction or AUX, as
basic elements of the syntactic analysis, does not force this researcher to take sides in
this question. Our consideration of this research as ‘‘weakly minimalist’’ does not refer
to any position that has been declared by the author, but to the pattern he adopts in his
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explanation of the concrete fact of language acquisition that he studies, which is
grounded in considerations of ‘‘conceptual-intentional’’ order.
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